The existing theoretical literature does not take into consideration the existence of non-traded goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the nontraded sectors in analyzing the consequences of liberalized investment policies on the relative wage inequality in the developing countries. The present paper purports to fill in this gap using two four-sector general equilibrium models reasonable for a developing economy. We have found that inflows of foreign capital usually improve the wage inequality when the low-skill sector is capital-intensive. But, the relative wage gap may widen if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive. When the non-traded sector produces a non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens if the low-skill sector is capitalintensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled workforce and if the primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. Appropriate policy recommendations for improving the wage inequality have also been made.
FOREIGN CAPITAL AND SKILLED-UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY WITH NON-TRADED GOODS

Introduction:
Developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy and been vigorously implementing liberalized trade and investment policies for the last two decades or so. Radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global trade have been undertaken in manufacturing commodities. FDI norms have liberalized considerably and several sectors, hitherto protected, have been opened up to foreign capitalists so that inflows of foreign capital take place in abundance in order to facilitate economic growth. It is important to mention that the developing countries have been able to attract a substantial amount of foreign capital during the period of economic reforms.
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The new development approach has not so far been an unmixed blessing. In their endeavor in implementing liberalized economic policies the developing countries have been facing some adjustment costs. Increasing skilled-unskilled wage inequality 2 and unemployment of unskilled labour are two major exacerbating problems of the developing world in the post-reform era. It is quite perplexing as to why the relative wage inequality has deteriorated, especially when as per the baseline 2×2×2 Heckscher-OhlinSamuelson trade model, economic liberalization was expected to improve the wage inequality in the developing economies following increases in the prices of the export commodities as these are generally exporters of commodities that are intensive in the use of unskilled labour. The scanty theoretical literature explaining the deteriorating wage inequality in the developing countries includes works of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2007) and Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004) . They have shown how trade liberalization, international migration of labour and inflows of foreign capital might produce unfavourable effects on the wage inequality in the South given the specific structural characteristics of the less developed countries, such as features of labour markets, structures of production, nature of capital mobility etc.
As per the empirical literature, growth in foreign direct investment which is positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled labour has been one of the prime factors 3 responsible for the growing incidence of wage inequality in the Southern countries. The paper of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is based on the famous Dornbusch-FischerSamuelson continuum-of-goods framework. According to them, inflows of foreign capital induced greater production of skilled-intensive commodities in Mexico, thereby leading to a relative decrease in the demand for unskilled labour. Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004) have analyzed how diverse trade pattern and market fragmentation in world trade can adversely affect the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the developing countries. They have also studied the consequences of an improvement of terms of trade and inflows of foreign capital on wage inequality with or without trade fragmentation.
The paper finds that without trade fragmentation improvements in terms of trade and/or inflows of foreign capital may worsen wage inequality if the vertically integrated skilled export sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the import-competing sector. But, with trade fragmentation the consequences on the relative wage inequality might be different.
goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors in analyzing the consequence of foreign capital inflows on the relative wage inequality.
The existence of non-traded goods, the prices of which are determined domestically by demand-supply forces, is an essential feature of a developing economy. Liberalized economic policies are supposed to move resources away from the non-traded sectors to the traded sectors of the economy. The non-traded sectors usually use backward technologies of production and are intensive in the use of unskilled labour. Non-traded goods may be either inputs or final commodities. A non-traded sector that produces an intermediate good for a traded sector lives or dies with the latter. On the contrary, a final good-producing non-traded sector expands or contracts with an increase or a decrease in the purchasing power of the people who consume the commodity. Hence how the prices of non-traded goods change in response to policy changes plays a crucial role in determining the direction of relative wage movements. Furthermore, capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors may be of different types. If the non-traded sector produces an agricultural commodity there should be capital mobility between the non-traded sector and the primary export sector while capital is likely to flow freely between the non-traded, low-skill manufacturing and the high-skill sectors if the nontraded sector produces a manufacturing good. The outcomes of any policy changes on the relative wages should depend on the type of the non-traded good and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors.
The present paper purports to address the above shortcomings of the existing theoretical literature on wage inequality in terms of two four-sector 5 general equilibrium models reasonable for a developing economy. First, the case of non-traded input is taken up where one of the four sectors produces an intermediate good for another sector. Both these sectors use unskilled labour, and capital flows freely between them. There is also capital mobility between these sectors and the high-skill sector while in the latter skilled 5 One should ideally make use of a four-sector general equilibrium for capturing simultaneously both non-traded goods and imperfections in the market for unskilled labour.
labour is a specific input. We then deal with the case of final commodity where capital 6 is mobile only between the primary export sector and the non-traded sector. These two sectors, however, cannot receive capital from/ lend capital to the other sectors i.e. the low-skill manufacturing sector and the high-skill sector. There is imperfection in the market for unskilled labour in the low-skill sector (formal sector) where unskilled workers receive a high unionized wage while their counterparts in the other two sectors receive only a low and competitive wage. The capital endowment of the economy consists of both domestic capital and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes.
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The consequences of foreign capital inflows on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality have been examined in these two alternative scenarios. The interesting results that emerge from the theoretical exercise are as follows. When the non-traded sector produces an intermediate input, inflows of foreign capital improve the wage inequality if the lowskill manufacturing sector is capital-intensive (in a special sense) relative to the high-skill sector. On the contrary, relative wages may move against unskilled labour when the highskill sector is capital-intensive and the low-skill sector employs only a very small proportion of unskilled workforce. But, in the case of the non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens (improves) if the low-skill sector (high-skill sector) is capitalintensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled workforce and if the primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. A wage subsidy policy and/or a capital subsidy policy should be undertaken under different circumstances so as to make wages move in favour of unskilled workers.
6 These two sectors use land which is one type of capital in a wider sense. To avoid confusion, however, we can call this input land-capital which is broadly conceived to include durable capital equipments of all kinds. See Bardhan (1973) and Chaudhuri (2007) in this context.
The model with non-traded intermediate input
Let us consider a small open economy with four sectors. Sector 1 is the primary export sector that produces an agricultural commodity using unskilled labour and land-capital.
The input 'land-capital' is broadly conceived to include durable capital equipments of all kinds.
8
Sector 2 produces a non-traded input for the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 3)
with the help of unskilled labour and capital. It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. In industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their production to small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the production is done in the informal sector while labeling, packaging and marketing are done by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. It is also observed that that one car uses four tyres and one TV set requires one picture tube. Thus, there remains a fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate good and the quantity of the final commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. On the other hand, if sector 2 produces an agricultural product like sugarcane or cotton, there might exist a fixed-proportion between the quantity of input used and the quantity of output produced in the sugar mills/textile firms. It may be noted that papers like Chaudhuri (2003) , Marjit (2003) and Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi and Mukhopadhyay (2006) have also made this assumption for different reasons.
domestically. The diverse trade pattern of the economy is reflected in the fact that it exports both the primary agricultural and the high-skill commodities while it is a net importer of the low-skill manufacturing commodity. A developing country which fits this type of comparative advantage is India. 10 Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality conditions relating to the four sectors of the economy are given by the following four equations, respectively.
The formal sector faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized wage rate is specified as:
whereU denotes the bargaining strength of the trade unions. This relationship states that in the absence of any bargaining power 13 of the trade unions i.e. when , 0 = U the wage 12 Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the representative union in the formal sector. For detailed derivation see Chaudhuri (2003). rates are equal in different sectors. However, the unionized wage rate in sector 3, * W , exceeds the competitive wage rate, W , when there is at least some power to the trade unions. The unionized wage is scaled upward as the competitive wage rate rises. Also with an increase in the bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage.
For the sake of analytical simplicity we consider the following specific algebraic form of the unionized wage function.
Hereα denotes the degree of imperfection in the market for unskilled labour. Higher the bargaining strength of the trade unions the higher would be the value ofα .
Using (3), equation (5) can be rewritten as follows.
Full-employment conditions for unskilled labour, capital, land-capital and skilled labour are as follows, respectively.
The output of sector 2, 2 X , is used entirely for producing 3 X , so that the supply of 2 X is circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand -supply equality condition is given by
13 The union power, denoted byU , is amenable to policy measures. If the government undertakes labour market reform measures e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade unions, reformation of employment security laws to curb union power, U takes a lower value.
There are nine endogenous variables in the system :   2  1  2  3 , , , , , , , S W W R r P X X X and 4 X ; and, nine independent equations, namely, equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4) and (6) - (10). This is an indecomposable production system. Hence factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Using (8) and (9), equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten as follows, respectively. (1), (2), (3.1), (4), (8.1) and (9.1) simultaneously. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, ji a s, are also known. 1 X , 4 X and 2 X are obtained from equations (8), (9) and (10), respectively.
Unskilled workers in this economy earn two different wages − either the unionized wage, * W , in sector 3 or the competitive wage,W , in sectors 1 and 2. The average wage for unskilled labour must be a weighted average of the two wage rates and is given by
and using (5) which can be rewritten as follows. (1), (2), (3.1), (4), (8.1) and (9.1) the following expression can be derived. 
From (12) it is evident thatˆ( ) 0
This establishes the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1:
When the non-traded informal sector produces an input for the lowskill manufacturing sector an inflow of foreign capital improves the skilled-unskilled wage inequality if (i) the vertically integrated low-skill formal sector is capital-intensive (in a special sense) 15 ; and, (ii)
. The relative wage inequality, however, deteriorates if the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the low-skill formal sector is significantly low and the high-skill sector is capital-intensive.
14 See Appendix I for detailed derivation of this expression.
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Here sectors 3 and 4 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a special type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile factor i.e. capital may be used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this share is higher relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and Neary (1984) for details.
Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. As the system does not satisfy the decomposition property factor prices depend on both final commodity prices and factor
endowments. An inflow of foreign capital lowers the return to capital, r , as the supply rises given the demand. All the three capital-using sectors expand. Sector 2 expands because sector 3 uses the output of the former as input in fixed proportion. 
The modified system with non-traded final commodity
In this section we propose to modify the model of section 2 in two directions. First, sector 2 now produces a non-traded final commodity using unskilled labour and land-capital as two inputs. Thus, sectors 1 and 2 constitute a miniature HOS subsystem. Secondly, we introduce land-capital in the non-traded sector as well as in the primary export sector.
Capital is perfectly flows freely between the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 3) and the high-skill sector (sector 4). But, there is no capital mobility between the high-skill (or low-skill) sector and the non-traded sector. This setup fits well to developing countries that still have a dual structure with rural and urban areas.
In addition to the symbols that we have used in section 2 we shall here use the following symbols as well. The usual zero-profit conditions for the four sectors are as follows. 
The demand for the non-traded final commodity is given by the following. The demand for commodity 2 is a positive function ofY and a decreasing function of 2 P .
So we have:
The market for commodity 2 must clear domestically. So in equilibrium we have
Full-employment conditions for resources are as follows.
The modified model comprises of (11) equations (namely, equations (14) - (24) 
Differentiating (14) - (17), (19) - (24) and (25) 
where:
.
The expression for Ω has been presented in Appendix II and using the static stability condition in the market for the non-traded commodity 21 it can be shown that in the stable equilibrium we must have:
Note that relative factor intensity between sectors 1 and 2
plays an extremely crucial role in determining the 20 See Appendices II, III and IV for mathematical derivation of this expression.
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The stability condition has been derived in Appendix V. 
From the results one now establish the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2:
When the non-traded sector produces an agricultural commodity and there is another common factor, land-capital, in the non-traded sector and the primary export sector, inflows of foreign capital are likely to improve the skilled-unskilled wage inequality if the low-skill manufacturing sector is capital-intensive and employs a significant proportion of the unskilled labour force. On the contrary, when the low-skill sector employs only a very small proportion of unskilled labour the wage inequality improves if the primary export sector is land-capital-intensive (or unskilled labourintensive) and the low-skill manufacturing sector (or high-skill sector) is capitalintensive. The relative wage inequality, however, deteriorates provided the primary export sector is land-capital-intensive (or labour-intensive) and the high-skill sector (lowskill sector) is capital-intensive.
We explain proposition 2 in the following fashion. Here the non-traded sector and the primary export sector use the same two inputs− unskilled labour and land-capital, and together form a Hechscher-Ohlin Subsystem (HOSS). We have already stated that the factor prices come out from the price system as functions of the price of the non-traded good, 2 P , and that 2 P is determined by its demand and supply forces. Besides, an inflow of foreign capital leads to expansion of both sector 3 and sector 4. As sector 3 expands more (less) unskilled workers are now employed in the higher (lower) wage-paying sector (sectors). This raises the aggregate unskilled wage income. This we call the unskilled labour reallocation effect, which produces a positive effect on the aggregate factor income,Y and raises the demand for the non-traded good (good 2). As sector 3 draws unskilled labour from the HOSS a Rybczynski type effect takes places that results in a contraction of the unskilled labour-intensive sector and an expansion of the other. capital cost will be higher (lower) in the low-skill sector than that in the high-skill sector.
Consequently, the wage inequality improves (worsens).
If sector 1 (sector2) is unskilled labour-intensive (land-capital-intensive) the supply of the non-traded good rises following a Rybczynski type effect. The larger is the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the low-skill sector, the higher would be the magnitude of the Rybczynski type effect in the HOSS. Although both the demand and the supply of the non-traded good increase, the Rybczynski type effect of a sufficiently high magnitude > < increase on capital cost will be higher (lower) in the high-skill sector vis-à-vis the low-skill sector. Consequently, the wage inequality improves (worsens).
Policy implications and concluding remarks
Growth in foreign direct investment, positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled labour, has been one of the prime factors responsible for widening of wage inequality in the Latin American countries like Mexico. But, foreign capital cannot be held accountable for the growing incidence of wage inequality in the developing economies in general. It is extremely important to judge the consequences of foreign capital in the light of the typical structural characteristics of these countries e.g. presence of non-traded goods, imperfections in the market for unskilled labour and type of intersectoral capital mobility. This has been done in this paper using two four-sector specific factors general equilibrium models.
We have found that barring a few special cases inflows of foreign capital in general improve the wage inequality when the low-skill sector is capital-intensive. But, the relative wage gap may widen if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive. A capital subsidy policy to the low-skill manufacturing sector should be undertaken so as to increase the capital-intensity of production in this sector. On the other hand, when the non-traded sector produces a non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens if the low-skill sector is capital-intensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled workforce and if the primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. In such a case, the policy prescription should be to provide a wage subsidy to the low-skill sector. A wage subsidy would help in increasing the proportion of employment of unskilled labour in the low-skill sector. This would also lend a hand in raising the competitive unskilled wage. If these policies are followed whenever necessary abundant inflows of foreign capital might be a solution to deteriorating skilled-unskilled wage in the liberalized regime.
Appendix I:
Differentiating totally equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4) and (6) - (10) and arranging in a matrix notation one gets:
and,
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through adjustments in its price, 2 P . The stability condition in the market for commodity 2
/ )) 0. X P − < This requires that 0. ∆ > In this case, of course, the stability condition is automatically satisfied. This is because from (A.2) and (A.3) it follows that ∆ is unconditionally positive.
Solving (A.1) by Cramer's rule the following expressions are obtained. 
Using (A.2) and (A.3) from (A.4) -(A.9) the following results are obtained.
i.e. sector 3 is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 with respect to unskilled labour).
Appendix II:
Total differentials of (14) - (17) yield the following expressions, respectively. Differentiating totally equations (21), (22) and (23.1) one gets, respectively. 
X also can be solved in the same manner. The final expression for 3 X has been derived in Appendix VI. Using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 it can be shown that: 3 0 X > whenˆ0 K > From (A.25) -(A.28) the following results can be obtained.
1. If sector 1 is more land-capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 with respect to unskilled labour (i.e. , * 0; 0
If sector 1 is more labour-intensive (but not sufficiently labour-intensive) than sector 2 (i.e. 0;
If sector 1 is sufficiently labour-intensive (i.e. , * 0;
Differentiating (25) one gets:
Using (A.25) and (A.27) the above expression may be simplified to
Subtracting (A.30) from (A.26), using (A.25) and (A.27) and simplifying we get:
For the sake analytical convenience we rewrite (A.31) as follows.
The notation, * λ , has already been defined in (A.29).
Appendix V: Stability condition of the market for commodity 2
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through adjustments in its price, 2 P . The stability condition of the market for commodity 2
. This implies around equilibrium, initially,
Totally differentiating equations (14) - (17) and solving one can find out the following expressions. 
